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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
GARRY S. DUPONT, : Case No. 20010952-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE: THE CONVICTION FOR INTERFERING WITH AN ARREST 
FAILS FOR INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE. 
A. Dupont Properly Marshaled the Evidence in Challenging the 
Sufficiency of the Evidence on Appeal. 
The State asserts in its brief ("S.B.") that Appellant Garry S. Dupont ("Dupont") 
ignored two facts in contravention of his marshaling requirement on appeal. S.B. 17. 
The State does not, however, suggest that his appeal should be affirmed for lack of 
marshaling. S.B. Point I.C; see, e.g., Campbell v. Box Elder Ctv. 962 P.2d 806, 808 
(Utah App. 1998) (appellant's challenge to factual finding will be rejected for failure to 
marshal evidence; appellate court assumes evidence supports factual findings in such 
instances). As discussed below, such a position would be unfounded in this case since 
Dupont in fact fulfilled the marshaling requirement. See State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, 
^14, 989 P.2d 1065 (citation omitted) (requiring appellant to fully marshal evidence in 
light favorable to conviction prior to demonstrating insufficiency of evidence on appeal). 
Under Utah case law concerning the marshaling requirement, Dupont clearly 
satisfied his burden on appeal. For example, in Neely v. Bennett, 2002 UT App 189, 51 
P.3d 724, this Court ruled that the appellant did not meet her marshaling requirement 
because she merely "reargu[ed] the evidence presented at trial that was favorable to her 
position." Id at ^ [12. In Heinecke v. Dept. of Commerce, Div. of Occupational and 
Prof 1 Licensing, 810 P.2d 459 (Utah App. 1991), this Court similarly held that the 
appellant did not meet his marshaling requirement where he "reviewed in minute detail 
all the evidence before the Nursing Board," rather than culling out the evidence that 
supported its findings. LI at 464; see also West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 
P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah App. 1991) (holding that appellant did not meet marshaling 
requirement where he only presented a "general catalogue of evidence" rather than facts 
that "correlate[d]" challenged findings). 
Unlike the appellants in Neelv, Heinecke, or Majestic, Dupont did not merely 
reargue his position in marshaling the evidence, nor did he catalogue every speck of 
evidence presented at trial, leaving it to this Court to discern which facts supported the 
jury's verdict. Rather, he assiduously noted the points of evidence that supported the 
verdict, even the damaging facts. See Appellant's Brief ("A.B.") at 9-10. He marshaled 
evidence that Officer Wyant gave him the opportunity to take the shaving kit before the 
search, but that he declined to take the kit. A.B.9; R.286[91,94,130]. He also marshaled 
evidence that he repeatedly said, "give me my shaving bag, give me my shaving bag," 
once it was discovered by Wyant. A.B.9; R.286[94]. He also noted that Wyant testified 
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he fled the scene and contim , . . . A\± IUIU to stop and even after the 
officers gave chase. A.B. 10; R.286[95-96j 1l' marshaled evidence that he 
i,""h approximately 30 feet before being apprehended, as well as r* . •. o.ianle 
statements that he made to the police, including "I give up, I give up" and ^ -^ ' ' 
catch the big fish." A l l 10; l?„1"7«C)| (*f>, 11' ', i • i, i i -1 i inally, Dupont noted that he was 
observed at a known drug house and win
 :_ u L. ... A prior to the stop, 
.. .- 114,116]. In short, Duponi appropriate11 - ' „u\ocatc in 
presenting • . -. uL ice supporting the |ur\ 's verdict. Neely, 2002 I IT , \pp 
189 at ^111. Accordin ir uon that. •, , i»d not marshal evidence is 
without merit. S.B.PointLC. 
Moreover, the particular evidence that the State claim I h,poiti ignored is enher 
exceed!1 \ A\ iia record or does not support the J**;'} a vudiet s 
of the marshaling *v-\ . • • . ^,u- po^iis that Officer Wyunt testified during 
cror ^ -examination and on redirect tha: Knighton to detain Dupont, in 
uliJui-nii in motioning to him lodu so. S.Ii.17 n.6; R.286* ta . . . 
did in IVI »i(<;c \\\ , iv,nd i-^ l.l" «n his testimony, R.286[I vl.l42J, the meanii .. • it 
word is quite unclear whe^ : .n^re thorough explanation of the event 
-.u* -ng direct examination, which was conduced h\ I|K; \\ ^seiui- w I'here, the 
ccuior asked: 
What Ciu - ; u v™] saw these things fin the shaving kit]? 
. Wyant* V ^ »* ' 1 I remained in the \ chicle unci motioned out to 
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Deputy Knighton to detain Mr. Dupont at that point in time. 
Prosecutor: Did you tell Deputy Knighton why you wanted him to detain 
the defendant? 
Wyant: No, I did not. 
R.286[95]. 
When Wyant later testifies that he "told" Knighton to detain Dupont, it is in a 
much more cursory explanation of the events, and neither the prosecutor nor defense 
counsel is focused on the manner in which he "told" Knighton (i.e. - by motion or actual 
words). For example, the defense's cross-examination focused on what Dupont knew 
about whether he was free to leave; it was not an exploration of Wyant's semantics. 
R.286[133]. Likewise, the prosecutor's redirect examination of Wyant was focused on 
the time line of events, and not necessarily on how Wyant "told" Knighton to detain 
Dupont. R.286[ 142]. There is no attempt at clarification of this point. Id 
Consequently, Wyant's use of the word "told" is exceedingly vague in the record. 
R286[133,142]. It is much more clear, however, that he "motioned" to Knighton. 
R.286[95]. 
The marshaling requirement requires that the appellant refrain from providing a 
"general catalogue"of evidence presented at trial and burdening this Court with the task 
of sifting through it to gauge which facts support the jury's verdict. Majestic, 818 P.2d at 
1315; see also Heinecke, 810 P.2d at 464. In light of the substantial ambiguity of the 
evidence and the lack of clarification of Wyant's use of the word "told," inclusion of that 
evidence among the marshaled facts would have amounted to the sort of meaningless 
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"catalogue" of evidence sanr* wajesiie. <S 18 i\2d at 1 " 1 ~ . and Heinecke, 810 
Jr\2d at 464. Ace ,„:igly, the facts marshaled nis opening brief are 
* iaie in that they present this Court with the cvn\ , : i. HI, die jury 
W I U K { . 
The State also pc .... ,,apon; dir1 not marshal his statement, 
11 |liose items aren't mine," uttered when f )I1HVI \V\ .mi opened his shaving bag. 
h , *•<!, . .:_-....
 j This evidence was not iuw^uued anion fj the HMJ\liiiluJ lacts because it 
s ..... .. ^.noccncc rather than the jury's verdict th i .. 
interfere with an arrest. ,. ^uc n. h^ opening brief, Dupont asserted in..* * 
was unaware of the drugs in his .;h \ - , he lelt ihe scene of the stop under 
the understanding that he was free to leave. A.n.lVim i \ JX(>| 2>v-Su j, His statement 
disavow iiu.' un in, i"s!np oi ihe drugs goes directly to his defense. 
appellants are expivs^h d«i"t\tal \H this i/ourt to refrain from "rearguing" their position 
in carrying out the marshaling rccjniieinnit, ...v ^ . ~ ^ I App 189 at [^12. Such does 
not ser ve the purpose of marshaling, which i '• with a crystalline set 
of fht.K supporting the jury's verdict. See id. 
Moreover, like ih«' o itlenee about whether Wyant "told" K nighton to detain 
Dupont, there is su,_ , ambient* tatement. Contrary to the State's 
assertion on appeal, it is not clear at all that D'TC-M - . anient ngftt when 
Wynni opened ihe NIIIUIIIL; kit SJB.17, Iv fai\ \VyantcouiuiiuiK,"..> • ; if \)\\y MI« 
5 
said those words at all. R.286[132]. Even when his recollection was refreshed by the 
prosecutor using Deputy Knighton's report, Wyant denied hearing the statement, saying: 
[The report] says that I continue to process the vehicle. I don't recall Garry 
saying anything about those items. He may have to Deputy Knighton. 
Prosecutor: Okay. You just didn't hear him. 
Wyant: No. I didn't hear him. 
R.286[133]. 
Consequently, there is substantial ambiguity surrounding Dupont's statement. 
Indeed, it is not even clear that the statement was made at all. To the extent that an 
appellant's marshaling duty is designed to provide this Court with the facts supporting 
the jury's verdict, and not a "general catalogue" of any and all evidence presented at trial, 
Dupont appropriately marshaled the evidence in his opening brief to include only the 
facts that "correlate^]" the jury's guilty verdict. Majestic, 818 P.2d at 1315. 
B. Trial Counsel Was Ineffective in Failing to Challenge the Sufficiency 
of the Evidence Underlying the Charge of Resisting Arrest. 
The State contends that Dupont is arguing that defense counsel was per se 
ineffective for failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence insofar as he relies on 
State v. Hoteate. 2000 UT 74, 10 P.3d 346. S.B.12. Contra ry to the State's assertion, 
Dupont duly recognizes that under the current law governing ineffective assistance 
claims an attorney's tactical decision to not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence may 
not fall below a reasonable standard of professional care in certain circumstances. 
A.B.16 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688-94 (1984); Taylor v. 
6 
Warden. 905 P.2d 277, 282 (Utah 1995)). Accordingly, Dupont recognizes that 
Hoi gate's holding is limited to the rule that "a defendant must raise [a challenge to] the 
sufficiency of the evidence by proper motion or objection to preserve the issue for 
appeal." 2000 UT 74 at f 16. It does not set forth a rule that states failure to do so is 
ineffective per se where the decision to not make a sufficiency challenge is tactical. 
However, the present case does not present a scenario where such an omission can 
be justified as tactical or, as the State alleges, on the basis that it would have been futile. 
S.B.13: see State v. Kelley. 2000 UT 41, [^26, 1 P.3d 546 (M[f]ailure to raise futile 
objections does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel"). As noted in Dupont1 s 
opening brief, there is no tactical reason for not challenging the sufficiency of the 
evidence since such motion can readily and quickly be raised before the court and outside 
the presence of the jury. A.B.I 6. Moreover, such challenges are fairly routine and do 
not take a lot of research or preparation beyond familiarizing one's self with the particular 
facts of the defendant's case and the statutory offense at issue, in this case interfering 
with arrest. See Utah Code Ann. §76-8-305 (1999). 
In addition, a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in this case cannot 
reasonably be viewed as futile considering the ambiguity of the evidence against Dupont. 
As discussed at length in his opening brief, there is considerable evidence that he was 
unaware of the drugs found in his shaving kit and that he thought he was free to go when 
he left the scene. A.B. Point LA. Moreover, there was very little evidence beyond his 
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mere presence connecting him to the drug house or the activity of Lund, the known drug 
suspect who was originally under investigation in this case. IJL Indeed, the paucity of 
evidence in this case compelled the jury to acquit Dupont of the two felony possession 
offenses that he was charged with. R.255; see. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 
2000). 
Considering the weak evidence against Dupont and the juryfs willingness to acquit 
on all the drug charges, a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for the remaining 
interfering charge is a reasonable strategy in this case. A reasonable professional in 
defense counsel's position would have recognized the willingness of the jury to acquit, 
and consequently would have appealed to the judge in a final effort to plead his client's 
innocence. The judge may have shared in the jury's willingness to acquit. Coupled with 
a judge's superior knowledge of the legal aspects of the argument, a reasonable defense 
attorney would have at least made the argument. Indeed, it is the role of the defense 
attorney to advocate all reasonable stances at trial, including the innocence of the 
defendant of a particular charge. Accordingly, defense counsel's failure to challenge the 
sufficiency of the evidence cannot be justified as tactical and, therefore, within the 
bounds of reasonable professional advocacy. See. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-94; Taylor, 
905P.2dat282.1 
1
 Dupont submits on his opening brief in response to any arguments raised by the 
State that are not expressly addressed herein. 
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CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing and based on the arguments set forth in his opening brief, 
Dupont respectfully requests this Court to reverse his conviction for interfering with 
arrest for lack of sufficient evidence supporting the verdict. Alternatively, Dupont 
requests this Court to reverse his conviction and remand to the trial court on the basis of 
the prejudicial submission of the flight instruction. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this f^day of September, 2002. 
CATHERINE E. LILLY 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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